Privacy Anthropomorphizes Information

October 30, 2018

Jason M. Pittman, DSc

Stock photo of a rock with human features

Privacy must end. If we are to understand why, we first need to grasp how privacy is flawed. As a step towards this goal, I claimed that privacy is flawed in four specific ways. We've already discussed the first flaw, privacy as a zero-sum heuristic. Now, I want to present my argument regarding the second flaw -- anthropomorphization of information. I view this flaw as a bit tricky to navigate compared to the previous case and so I want to take a moment in establishing an important distinction between similar phenomena.

Anthropomorphisms are created when we embody human characteristics in non-human objects. Take, for example, just about any Disney film; human-like dinnerware, walking and talking animals, or even the symbol of the Disney empire itself, Mickey Mouse. All of these objects are imbued with human characteristics so that the objects behave in a human manner. Yet, whereas anthropomorphism is a type of personification, the latter strictly applies to expressing a human characteristic as opposed to embodying one. For example, consider this expression: the breeze whispered through the trees. Breezes are not human and therefore do not have a whisper capability. Likewise, consider the embodiment of human facial features on a cloud that blows the breeze.

Based on those distinctions, it may be tempting to view privacy as personifying information but I don't think that's the case. Privacy anthropomorphizes information because to seclude, limit, control, or know presupposes that such information can be acted upon. Further, such action treats the information as if the information were, for lack of a better descriptor, human-like.

Anthropomorphizing occurs along two dimensions in particular. Foremost, information is attributed with human mental states. I don't mean that information is emotionally sad or angry; such state conditions are a specific type of anthropomorphism outside of this argument. Rather, privacy imbues information with mental states such as wants, desires and so forth. Now, consider the parity and currency bases for the demand for privacy. Additionally, information is attributed with the perceived value of what it is to be human (i.e., phenomenology). In other words, we are our information and our information is us. Our understanding of the demand for privacy related to information permanency established this point quite well.

This is certainly a flaw, a deadly flaw. Having mental states presupposes having a mind, something decidedly human. Further, possessing phenomenology not only rests upon having a mind but also having consciousness sufficient to be introspective. Not only does this flaw work against the validity of privacy overall, but it also speaks to the inherent pathology associated with the demand for it. Further, while anthropomorphism is a useful tool during cognitive development, and certainly can be a source of entertainment, continuing to practice it in adulthood is to deny fundamental reality. Thus, I contend that anthropomorphism of information is tightly coupled to the third flaw in privacy. You see, privacy leads to the strong idea that society and culture are in a steady decline.

Dr. Jason M. Pittman is a scholar, professor, and cybersecurity thought leader. He currently is a full-time faculty member at Capitol Technology University.